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Partial Cartels and Mergers with Heterogeneous 
Firms: Experimental Evidence 
 
 
 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
A usual assumption in the theory of collusion is that cartels are all-inclusive. In contrast, 
most real-world collusive agreements do not include all firms that are active in the 
relevant industry. A classic example is the worldwide citric acid cartel that operated in 
the 1990s. It was formed by five firms and only encompassed around 60% of total 
production (Harrington, 2006). In Europe, the famous industrial copper tubes cartel that 
operated for 13 years (1988-2001) controlled only around 75% of the production. At 
least two significant producers did not participate in this agreement (Harrington, 2006). 
This gap between theory and real-world cases is recently approached in Bos and 
Harrington (2010) (B&H in the remainder of this paper) in a Bertrand-Edgeworth 
setting. They develop an infinitely repeated price game where firms are heterogeneous 
in terms of production capacities. They discard the all-inclusive cartel assumption and 
instead endogenize individual firms’ cartel decisions introducing internal and external 
stability as equilibrium refinement. They find that, for sufficiently patient firms, there 
exists an equilibrium where the largest firms join the cartel agreement while the other 
firms act as outsiders undercutting the collusive price.1 Even though this model is a big 
step ahead in fitting theory and reality, it has some limitations. As mentioned before, 
there are real-world partial cartels where some of the largest firms decide not to form 
part of the collusive agreement, which contradicts B&H’s predictions. In addition, in 
their model, participation in the cartel is an individual decision, not allowing for 
coalition formation during negotiations. 
This paper studies both theoretically and experimentally the formation and 
behavior of partial cartels. First, we build a theoretical model that is a variation of 
B&H’s. Keeping the main spirit of B&H unchanged, the main novelty found in this 
                                                           
1 They show there exist a capacity 𝑘∗ such that any firm 𝑖 with 𝑘𝑖 > 𝑘
∗ finds optimal to join the cartel 
and any firm 𝑗 with 𝑘𝑗 < 𝑘
∗ finds optimal not to join the cartel. 
model is that multiple equilibria exist in which partial cartels can involve both big and 
small firms. Second, the model is tested experimentally. This can help to shed light on 
which of these equilbria (if any) is behaviorally most relevant, and therefore more likely 
to arise in real world markets. In addition, we impose a redistribution of capacities 
between treatments (keeping the aggregate market capacity unchanged). This allows us 
to test what are the coordinated effects of a potential merger in industries where partial 
cartels are likely to arise. Because cartels are usually formed secretly in practice, 
availability of empirical data is limited. Therefore lab experiments, where the 
environment is totally controlled by the experimenter, can be useful as a tool to help 
policy makers to make antitrust decisions.2 In particular, this work can be seen as an 
example of how experimental merger simulations can be used by antitrust authorities 
for specific competition cases. Experimental oligopoly games can mimic particular 
market structures and therefore provide clear policy implications for specific market 
situations.  
The theoretical background developed in this paper combines features of 
models by B&H and Compte et al. (2002). In particular, the general downward sloping 
demand assumed in B&H is modified into a totally inelastic demand like in Compte et 
al. (2002). This modification is introduced for two reasons. First, predictions include 
also equilibria in which cartels are formed by both big and small firms. Second, this 
demand assumption makes decisions easier for experimental participants compared to 
the B&H setting. Our theory builds on Compte et al. (2002) in that it makes use of an 
equilibrium refinement for external and internal stability of the cartels formed. The 
imposition of this assumption reduces dramatically the number of partial cartels that 
can emerge in equilibrium.  
Our experimental study has two main objectives. The first goal is examine 
whether partial cartels emerge in the lab at all, and if so, which firms are part of it. 
Previous experimental works usually preclude the formation of partial cartels. Some 
papers restrict their analysis to duopolies, where collusive agreements are all-inclusive 
by definition.3 For papers analyzing triopolies, a unanimity rule is commonly imposed 
for cartels to establish, i.e.,  cartels only arise when all subjects in the same market agree 
                                                           
2 See Normann and Ricciuti (2009) and Normann (2006) for and extensive survey of experimental 
papers that contribute to policy decisions in general and antitrust decisions in particular. 
3 See, e.g., Potters et al. (2004), Offerman and Potters (2006), Andersson and Wengstrom (2007), 
Hamaguchi et al. (2009), Buchheit and Feltovich (2011) and Bigoni et al. (2012). 
to join the collusive agreement.4 For papers studying explicit collusion in markets with 
four or more firms, either a unanimity rule is used or communication is imposed to all 
firms by design, making again partial cartel formation not possible.5  As far as we are 
aware, only two experimental works allow for partial cartels in the lab. Hu et al. (2011) 
study collusive behavior in auctions. Partial cartels could be formed in one of their 
treatments, but the composition was imposed exogenously in that only a fixed subset of 
the bidders was able to form a cartel. In fact, this partial cartel could only be established 
when all bidders in the subset agreed on the formation of the cartel.  Clemens and Rau 
(2014) is the first experimental study allowing for endogenous partial cartel formation 
in the lab. In contrast to their theoretical predictions, all cartels found were all-inclusive. 
Subjects represented homogenous firms, creating serious coordination problems. In 
addition, the potential emergence of partial cartels would cause a substantial asymmetry 
in profits among subjects (outsiders would excessively profit from the formation of the 
cartel). To circumvent both issues, we introduce heterogeneous production capacities 
among firms, diminishing coordination and unfairness issues substantially. 
The second aim of the experiment is to illustrate how an experimental 
methodology could be applied to examine the coordinated effects of a merger. Because 
theoretical predictions may be inconclusive, characterizing the empirically most likely 
effects could be crucial for antitrust authorities when making merger decisions. In fact, 
for the specific merger simulation studied in our experiment, different and contradictory 
theoretical predictions can be derived from the literature. Models with heterogeneous 
firms and endogenous cartel formation, as B&H or the one developed in this study, 
predict less stable cartels after the merger imposed in the experiment, making collusion 
less likely. On the other hand, models with heterogeneous firms that assume all-
inclusive cartels (e.g., Compte et al. (2002) and Vasconcelos (2005)) predict no effect 
on the likelihood of collusion. Finally, a quick anti-competitive-effects analysis based 
on concentration measures like the Herfindahl-Hirschman index would suggest that 
there may be competition concerns. Therefore, our experimental design (applied to a 
setting that resembles the relevant market(s) on which the merger takes place) could 
                                                           
4 See, e.g., Apesteguia and Dufwenberg (2007), Gillet et al. (2011), Hinloopen and Soetevent (2008), 
and Hinloopen and Onderstal (2014).  
5 See, e.g., Hamaguchi et al. (2009),  Fonseca and Normann (2012), Fonseca and Normann (2014), 
Gomez-Martinez et al. (2016), 
help antitrust authorities to decide on which theoretical background they should base 
their merger decision. 
 Previous laboratory experiments also analyze the impact of mergers on market 
outcomes. The first and classic study in this area was David and Holt (1994). They 
study the impact of two different capacity reallocations on market prices. The baseline 
treatment has five sellers (three big and two small). In the second treatment, a capacity 
reallocation is imposed keeping constant the number of sellers but having an impact on 
the market power6 of big sellers.7  In the third treatment, a merger is imposed reducing 
the number of sellers to three and again creating market power to big sellers. They find 
that market power has a stronger effect on prices than the reduction of the number of 
sellers. David and Wilson (2006) run an experiment in which they introduce synergies 
that reduce the marginal cost of the merged firm. They observe that the negative effect 
caused by the increase in market concentration is offset by the positive effect of the 
synergy. Fonseca and Normann (2008) examine the relevance of unilateral and 
coordinated effects caused by a merger. They find that, keeping the number of firms 
constant, markets with symmetric structure are less competitive than more asymmetric 
markets with higher concentration measures. They conclude that such data patterns are 
more in line with coordinated effects than with unilateral effects. Finally, Davis (2002) 
and Davis and Wilson (2005) analyze experimentally the Antitrust Logit Model (ALM), 
a merger simulation model used by the US Department of Justice to make antitrust 
decisions involving mergers.8 They find that ALM works quite well for non-
problematic mergers but has some limitations for mergers that constitute a serious threat 
for competition.  
The experimental protocol developed in this study consists of a between-subject 
design where subjects represent firms that are heterogeneous in production capacities.  
Firms compete in prices for two parts of 15 rounds each.  At the beginning of each part, 
market composition and subjects’ roles are randomly determined. Subjects represent 
the same firm and face the same competitors for the 15 rounds of each part (fixed 
matching). Between parts, subjects are re-matched and firms’ roles are re-assigned. 
Firms have to pick the price of their product every round. In addition, they have to 
                                                           
6 In the sense that they are able to charge an individually  price higher than the competitive price and 
still sell their products. 
7The merger imposed in our study does not induce market power. Competitive price is still Nash 
Equilibrium for all firms after the merger. 
8 See Werden and Froeb (1994) for details of ALM. 
decide whether to be part of a cartel every five rounds. Subjects joining the cartel 
agreement can communicate with other cartel members through a chat window before 
making a price decision.  Communication is costly and unrestricted with a time limit of 
5 minutes. Distribution of firms’ capacities is varied between treatments. In the Baseline 
Treatment, each market is formed by 6 firms (3 big firms and 3 small firms). In the 
Merger Treatment, the redistribution of capacities simulates a merger between a big 
and a small firm, resulting in a market of 5 firms (3 big firms and 2 small firms).  
  Our experimental results can be summarized as follows. When analyzing firms’ 
cartel decisions, we find that big firms join the cartel agreement more often than small 
firms in the Baseline Treatment, which is qualitatively in line with the theoretical 
prediction that partial cartels form involving only the big firms in the Baseline 
Treatment. In the Merger Treatment, big firms do not join the cartel agreement more 
frequently than small firms, which is, to some extent, consistent with the theoretical 
prediction that cartel agreements involve both big and small firms in the Merger 
Treatment.9 Comparing outcomes between treatments, we observe that market prices 
are 20% lower after the merger. Even though the difference is not statistically 
significant, the analysis suggests that the merger should be cleared. More importantly, 
if we focus our attention to markets where firms that decide to communicate control 
enough capacity to form a profitable cartel,10 we find a clear significant difference in 
market prices between treatments: prices decrease more than 30% after the merger. 
Therefore the merger increases competition mainly in markets where a cartel is in 
operation. This can be explained by the stability of the cartels formed. In markets where 
an effective cartel was reached, cartels lasted 8.9 rounds on average in the Baseline 
Treatment, but only 4.8 rounds in the Merger treatment.  
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we present the theoretical 
model that we want to test in our experiment. Section 3 presents the experimental design 
and protocol and provides some benchmark predictions and experimental hypotheses.  
Section 4 discusses the experimental results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
 
                                                           
9 See benchmark predictions in section 3. 
10 As will be shown later, in our setting, a successful explicit collusive agreement can only be reached 
if firms joining communication represent at least 60% of total market capacity. 
 2. Theory 
This section develops a model on which the experimental protocol is based and from 
which several hypotheses are derived that we test in our experiment. Consider a market 
with 𝑛 ≥ 2 firms, labelled 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛, competing in an infinitely repeated price game 
with homogenous goods. Firms are heterogeneous in terms of production capacities. 
Each firm is capacity constrained: Firm 𝑖 can produce at most 𝑘𝑖  units of the good per 
period. Without loss of generality we assume 𝑘1 ≥ ⋯ ≥ 𝑘𝑛 .  𝐾 ≡ ∑ 𝑘𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1  is the 
aggregate capacity in the market. Firms can perfectly monitor decisions and payoffs of 
the other firms (the entire history is common knowledge) and they discount future 
profits with a common discount factor 𝛿 ∈ [0,1). The set of feasible prices is assumed 
to be discrete: firms choose their price from the set {0, 𝜀, 2𝜀, … , 𝑣 − 𝜀, 𝑣}, where 𝑣 is a 
multiple of 𝜀 and 0 < 𝜀 < 𝑣.11  
Firms have a common marginal cost 𝑐 = 𝑚𝜀 ≥ 0, where 𝑚 is an integer, and 
face a totally inelastic demand that consists of 𝑀 consumers, each willing to buy one 
unit of the good as long as the price does not exceed a common value 𝑣 > 𝑐. Consumers 
start buying the product of the firm(s) that charge the lowest price until its (their) 
capacities run out. Then, they start buying the products of the firm(s) with the next 
lowest price, and so on, until all consumers buy the product. If the sum of the capacities 
of all firms charging a common price is higher than the total demand they face, a 
proportional rule related to their size is applied to allocate the firms’ demand. Formally, 
let  𝐷𝑖(𝑃𝑖 , 𝑃−𝑖) denote the demand faced by firm 𝑖 given its price 𝑃𝑖 and the vector of 
prices of the other firms 𝑃−𝑖, Ω(𝑝) ≡ {𝑗: 𝑃𝑗 = 𝑝} the set of firms charging a common 
price 𝑝, and Φ(𝑝) ≡ {𝑗: 𝑃𝑗 < 𝑝} the set of firms charging a price lower than 𝑝. The 
following assumption is made: 
 
A1:                              𝐼𝑓 0 < 𝑀 − ∑ 𝑘𝑗𝑗∈Φ(𝑃𝑖) < ∑ 𝑘𝑖𝑖∈Ω(𝑃𝑖) 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 
 
 𝐷𝑖(𝑃𝑖 , 𝑃−𝑖) =
𝑀 − ∑ 𝑘𝑗𝑗∈Φ(𝑃𝑖)
∑ 𝑘𝑖𝑖∈Ω(𝑃𝑖)
𝑘𝑖 
                                                           
11 Some of the results are characterized for a sufficiently small 𝜀. All results can be generalized for a 
decision set of continuous prices. 
  
A1 is a proportional allocation rule broadly assumed in this type of models.12 13 
Similarly to B&H, another two restrictive but plausible assumptions are made in order 
to simplify the analysis: 
 
A2: 𝑘1 < 𝑀 
A3: ∑ 𝑘𝑗 ≥ 𝑀 ∀𝑖 𝑗≠𝑖  
 
A2 ensures that any firm charging a strictly lower price than all other firms will produce 
at capacity. A3 implies that marginal-cost pricing is a one-shot Nash Equilibrium. 
Finally, let 𝑃Γ and 𝐾Γ = ∑ 𝑘𝑖𝑖∈Γ  represent the price and the capacity controlled 
by cartel Γ ⊆ {1, … , 𝑛} respectively. From now on, we only consider cartels having 
𝐾Γ > 𝐾 − 𝑀. This condition ensures that cartel members are able to charge 𝑃Γ > 𝑐 + 𝜀 
and still face a positive residual demand in equilibrium. Only under this condition, 
cartel members can earn higher profits than in the one-shot Nash equilibrium.  
 Two equilibrium conditions are imposed for a potential collusive agreement: (1) 
Incentive compatibility in the case of infinitely repeated interaction: any deviation from 
the collusive agreement implies an infinite reversion to the one-shot Nash Equilibrium14 
and (2) Internal and external stability as defined in B&H:  
 
 
Definition 1a: A cartel Γ is internally stable if and only if: 
(1 − 𝛿)𝑉𝑖(𝑃Γ, Γ) > Π𝑖(Γ − {𝑖})  ∀ 𝑖 ∈ Γ 
 
Definition 1b: A cartel Γ is externally stable if and only if: 
                                                           
12 Imagine several firms charge the same price without any collusive agreement and that their products 
are evenly distributed in a certain location. It is clearly more likely that consumers find a product 
produced by a big firm than produced by a small firm.  A1 is more questionable when allocating the 
demand among cartel members. Nevertheless, this way of sharing profits is widely used in practice in 
cartel agreements. See Griffin (2001) and Röller and Steen (2006) for two famous cartel agreements 
that used this rule. 
13 This profit allocation can be seen as a fair bargaining equilibrium as argued in Rawls (1971). 
14 Because of A3 and the discreteness of the decision set, there are two one-shot Nash equilibrium 
prices: 𝑐 and  𝑐 + 𝜖. Only the latter price emerges as the outcome of a Nash equilibrium in 
undominated strategies. All calculations are made assuming that 𝑐 + 𝜖 is the price in the case of 
punishment. 
Π𝑗(Γ) ≥ (1 − 𝛿)𝑉𝑗(𝑃Γ, Γ + {𝑗}) ∀ 𝑗 ∉ Γ 
 
where 𝑉𝑖(𝑃Γ, Γ) is the present discounted value for the profit stream of firm  𝑖 ∈ Γ,  
Π𝑗(Γ) is the profit in a single period of a firm 𝑗 ∉ Γ.
15 Internal and external stability are 
static equilibrium conditions. In every single period, all outsiders prefer not to be a 
cartel member and all cartel members prefer to participate in the collusive agreement. 
This condition restricts considerably the number of cartels considered as equilibrium. 
An all-inclusive cartel and many partial cartels can be incentive compatible, but only a 
small set of partial cartels is also both internally and externally stable. 
The optimal pricing strategy for firms not belonging to the collusive agreement 
is stated in Proposition 1. An important implication is stated in Corollary 1.16 
 
Proposition 1: For any given cartel Γ charging price 𝑃Γ > 𝑐 + 𝜀 and controlling 
capacity 𝐾Γ > 𝐾 − 𝑀, the unique best response for all firms 𝑗 ∉ Γ is to undercut the 
cartel price, charging 𝑃Γ − 𝜀 in every period. 
Corollary 1: For any cartel Γ, cartel members produce below capacity and non-cartel 
members produce at capacity. 
 
Therefore, no equilibria exists where non-cartel members charge the same or a higher 
price than cartel members. 
The optimal pricing strategy for cartel members is stated in Proposition 2.  
 
Proposition 2: For 𝜀 ↓ 0, 𝑃Γ = 𝑣 uniquely maximizes joint profits of any cartel Γ 
controlling capacity 𝐾Γ > 𝐾 − 𝑀. 
 
This result is explained by the fact that the cartel agreements are equally stable for any 
agreed price 𝑃Γ > 𝑐 + 𝜀, i.e. there is no trade-off between increasing cartel stability and 
increasing cartel price and profits. This prediction differs from B&H but it is useful for 
our experimental design: any cartel charging 𝑃Γ > 𝑐 + 𝜀 is equally stable but only 
charging 𝑃Γ = 𝑣 maximizes joint profits. 17 
                                                           
15 Explicit mathematical definitions are found in Appendix A. 
16 All proofs are in Appendix A. 
17 For 𝜀 > 0 the effect on stability is negligible  
The next proposition states that any combination of firms facing a positive 
residual demand can form an incentive compatible cartel for a sufficiently high common 
discount factor. 
 
Proposition 3:  For any cartel Γ controlling 𝐾Γ > 𝐾 − 𝑀, there always exist a 
𝛿𝑚𝑖𝑛(Γ) ∈  (0,1) such that ∀ 𝛿 > 𝛿𝑚𝑖𝑛(Γ) it is incentive compatible. 
 
As said, to restrict the number of equilibria, external and internal stability is imposed. 
The following propositions characterize the conditions that need to be satisfied for a 
cartel to be internally and externally stable: 
 
Proposition 4a:  A cartel Γ is externally stable if and only if 
 𝜀 < 𝜀1 = (𝑣 − 𝑐) (
𝐾−𝑀
𝐾Γ+𝑘𝑗
) ∀ 𝑗 ∉ Γ. 
 
Proposition 4b: A cartel Γ is internally stable if and only if  
𝐾 − 𝐾Γ + 𝑘𝑖 ≥ 𝑀 ∀ 𝑖 ∈ Γ for any  𝜀 < 𝜀2 = (𝑣 − 𝑐)(𝑀 − 𝐾 + 𝐾Γ)
𝐾
𝐾Γ𝑀
.18 
 
In words, for sufficiently small 𝜀, any cartel Γ is externally stable, meaning that any 
outsider individually never finds it optimal to join a cartel in operation. The second part 
of the results shows that cartels are only internally stable if no firm can leave the cartel 
without implying that residual demand becomes 0 for the rest of the cartel members. 
 
 
3. Experimental procedures, experimental design and hypotheses 
 
3.1 Experimental procedures 
 
Markets formed in each part of the experiment differ from the theoretical model 
presented before in three aspects. First, for obvious technical reasons, the time horizon 
becomes finite. Second, we introduce costly communication possibilities among 
                                                           
18 𝜀1 and 𝜀2 are not restrictive: the result holds for a sufficiently small 𝜀. 
firms.19 Finally, firms individually and simultaneously decide whether to join the cartel 
agreement (the theoretical framework states which cartel compositions are equilibrium, 
but do not specify how these agreements are reached). 
Groups of six and five subjects (for the Baseline and Merger treatments 
respectively) were formed at the beginning of each session. Therefore, markets are 
formed by 6 firms in the Baseline Treatment and by 5 firms in the Merger Treatment. 
Firms compete in prices. All firms have zero cost of production.  Total capacity is 𝐾 =
270 in both treatments but only 𝑀 = 120 consumers are willing to buy the product at 
a reservation price of 𝑣 = 10. Each participant representing a firm has to make two 
decisions: 
 Decision 1: indicate whether she wants to join a cartel agreement by pushing a 
“yes” or a “no” button. Subjects joining the cartel agreement can communicate with 
other cartel members through a chat window before making a price decision. Cartel 
decision is made every 5 rounds (before rounds 1,6 and 11). Communication is possible 
only once after each cartel decision, it has a cost of 20 points, it is content free20 21 22 
and it has a time limit of 5 minutes. 
 
Decision 2: Pick the price of their product. Price decision is made every round. 
The participants could choose only integer prices from 0 to 10 (𝜀 = 1). Subjects are 
free to choose any price independently of the cartel decision they made and 
independently of the conversations emerged during the chat. 
 
 Subjects representing firms competed for two identical parts of 15 rounds each.23 
Subjects face the same competitors and represent the same firm for the 15 rounds of 
each part (fixed matching). Between parts, subjects from two different markets are re-
matched and their firms’ roles are re-assigned. Treatments only differed in the 
distribution of firms’ capacities and in the number of firms competing in the same 
                                                           
19 Without communication, collusion is rarely found in the lab for markets formed by three or more 
firms. See Huck et al. (2004). 
20  Usual restrictions were mentioned to the subjects: no offensive language and not to reveal your 
identity. 
21 Non-restrictive communication was chosen because this form of communication is the most 
effective to reach collusive agreements. See Cooper and Kuhn (2014).  
22 This option is the best to increase the external validity of the experiment. 
23 An ending probability is not included after period 15. Selten and Stoecker (1986) and Haan and 
Schoonbeek (2009) show that, excluding ending effects and for a sufficiently long time horizon, 
behaviour is the same in market games with and without ending probability. 
market. Participants only participated in one of the treatments (between-subject design). 
The parameters used for each of the treatments satisfy assumptions A1-A3.  A copy of 
the instructions for the Baseline Treatment can be found in Appendix E.  In addition, in 
order to be sure that subjects understood the rules of the game, they had to answer some 
test questions before the experiment started. In order to make price decisions easier, a 
profit calculator was available during the experiment for all subjects. They could 
introduce any price combination for all firms in the market, and the calculator would 
show the profits for each of the firms.  In addition, they have full information about past 
decisions and profits of all the firms in the market. 24 
The experiment was conducted at the CREED experimental laboratory at the 
University of Amsterdam. 11 computerized25 sessions were run, 6 for Baseline 
Treatment and 5 for the Merger Treatment. In total, 176 subjects participated in the 
experiment, forming 32 markets per treatment. Participants were Bachelor students 
from a variety of areas, mainly from Business and/or Economics. Total earnings 
consisted in a show up fee of 7 euros plus 1 euro for each 250 points earned during the 
30 rounds of the experiment. Sessions lasted between 60 and 90 minutes and average 
earnings were 18.91 euros. 
 
3.2 Experimental design 
 
The experimental design consists of two treatments: Baseline and Merger. Participants 
only participated in one of the treatments (between-subject design). 6 firms compete in 
the Baseline Treatment:  
• Firms 1,2 and 3 are large firms with production capacities per period of 𝑘1 =
80, 𝑘2 = 70 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑘3 = 60 respectively 
•  Firms firms 4, 5, and 6 are small firms with production capacities per period of 
𝑘4 = 𝑘5 = 𝑘6 = 20 respectively.  
 
The Merger Treatment simulates a merger between firms 2 and 6. Therefore 5 firms 
compete in prices:  
                                                           
24 In Appendix C, three screenshots can be seen that illustrate how cartel decision was introduced to 
subjects, how the chat window looked like and how past information is provided to the subjects.   
25 The program was written using PHP and MySQL. 
• 3 big firms (firms I, II, and III) with respective capacities 𝑘𝐼 = 90,  𝑘𝐼𝐼 =
80 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑘𝐼𝐼𝐼 = 60  
• 2 small firms (firms IV and V) with respective capacities 𝑘𝐼𝑉 = 𝑘𝑉 = 20. 
 
Therefore, firm I can be seen as the firm resulting from the merge between firms 2 and 
6 from the Baseline treatment. Firms II, III, IV and V can be seen as the pre-merger 
firms 1,3,4 and 5 respectively. The procedures are exactly the same in both treatments 
(only the distribution of capacities is varied).26 
  
 
3.3. Benchmark predictions and experimental hypotheses.  
 
In this section, we only consider cartels where joint-profits are maximized i.e. cartels 
charging 𝑃Γ = 10 (any 𝑃Γ < 10 do not increase cartel stability and reduces cartel 
profits).  Three types of benchmark predictions for the experimental Bertrand game are 
described. 
 
1) One-shot Nash Equilibrium: 𝑷𝒋 = 𝟏 (for both treatments). When no 
collusive agreement is successful in a certain market, prices converge to the 
competitive price. 
 
2) All-inclusive cartel:  Γ{1,2,3,4,5,6} 𝑜𝑟  Γ{𝐼,𝐼𝐼,𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝐼𝑉,𝑉}   ∶  𝑃Γ = 10 , 
𝛿𝑚𝑖𝑛( Γ{1,2,3,4,5,6}) = 𝛿𝑚𝑖𝑛( Γ{𝐼,𝐼𝐼,𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝐼𝑉,𝑉}) = 0.56 
  
Cartels formed by all firms are incentive compatible for the infinite period game in both 
treatments when firms’ common discount factor is bigger than 0.56.  In contrast, this 
type of cartel agreement is not internally stable: (see proposition 4b): 
𝐾 − 𝐾Γ + 𝑘𝑖 = 270 − 270 + 𝑘𝑖 < 120 = 𝑀    ∀ 𝑖 ∈ Γ  because 𝑘𝑖 < 120   ∀ 𝑖 ∈ Γ . 
All firms have strong incentives to individually leave the collusive agreement: the 
cartel still faces a positive residual demand after any firm  𝑖  leaves the agreement. 
 
                                                           
26 Tables B1 and B2 in Appendix B show all the parameters used in each treatment. 
3)  Incentive compatible, internally and externally stable partial cartels:  
a. For the Baseline Treatment:  
i.  Γ{1,2,3} ∶  𝑃Γ = 10, 𝑃𝑗 = 9  ∀𝑗 ∉  Γ , 𝛿𝑚𝑖𝑛( Γ{1,2,3}) = 0.71 
All the big firms form this partial cartel. Small firms act as 
outsiders undercutting the collusive price. This cartel is the one 
that requires the lowest minimum discount factor to be incentive 
compatible. 
 
ii.  Γ{1,2,𝑘} ,  Γ{1,3,𝑘} , Γ{2,3,𝑘,𝑙}: 𝑃Γ = 10, 𝑃𝑗 = 9  ∀𝑗  Γ ,
𝑘, 𝑙 𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠 
𝛿𝑚𝑖𝑛( Γ{1,2,𝑘}) = 𝛿𝑚𝑖𝑛( Γ{2,3,𝑘,𝑙}) = 0.88 ,   
𝛿𝑚𝑖𝑛( Γ{1,3,𝑘}) = 0.94  
Partial cartels formed by both big and small firms. 2 big firms 
and either 1 or 2 small firms can be part of an internally and 
externally stable cartel. They require a higher common discount 
factor than previous case to be incentive compatible. 
 
 
b. For the Merger Treatment:  
i.  Γ{𝐼,𝐼𝐼} ∶  𝑃Γ = 10, 𝑃J = 9  ∀𝑗 ∉  Γ , 𝛿𝑚𝑖𝑛( Γ{𝐼,𝐼𝐼}) = 0.88 
Partial cartel formed by the two biggest firms.  Firm III and small 
firms act as outsiders. It requires a high common discount factor 
to be incentive compatible.  
 
ii.  Γ{𝐼,𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝑘} ,  Γ{𝐼𝐼,𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝑘} , 𝑃Γ = 10, 𝑃J = 9  ∀𝑗 ∉  Γ , 𝑘 𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 
     𝛿𝑚𝑖𝑛( Γ{𝐼,𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝑘}) = 0.88 ,  𝛿𝑚𝑖𝑛( Γ{𝐼𝐼,𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝑘}) = 0.94 
Partial cartel formed by two big firms and a small firm. It 
requires a high common discount factor to be incentive 
compatible.  
 
 
 
 
From the benchmark predictions (and using minimum discount factor and internal and 
external stability as criteria) some experimental hypotheses can be derived and will be 
tested in the lab:   
 
 
Hypothesis 1: All-inclusive cartels do not form. 
 
Because this type of collusive agreement is not internally stable, each firm individually 
has strong incentives to leave the cartel agreement. In addition, due to the proportional 
allocation rule, profits are very asymmetric under this agreement.27 
 
Hypothesis 2: Partial cartels involving all the big firms will be found in the Baseline 
Treatment. 
 
This is the cartel agreement that is internally and externally stable with the lowest 
minimum discount factor to be incentive compatible in the Baseline Treatment. In 
addition, this agreement generates a symmetric distribution of profits. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Partial cartels involving the two biggest firms and partial cartels 
involving big and small firms will be found in the Merger Treatment. 
 
There is no clear focal cartel agreement equilibrium in the Merger Treatment, so 
different types of cartels may arise. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Cartels will be more stable in the Baseline Treatment than in the Merger 
Treatment. As a consequence, markets will become more competitive after the merger. 
 
In the Merger Treatment, all partial cartels in equilibrium generate a very asymmetric 
distribution of profits. In addition, the minimum discount factor necessary for these 
cartels to be incentive compatible is very high compared to the partial cartel agreement 
involving all big firms in the Baseline Treatment. As a consequence, firms have strong 
incentives to cheat on the collusive agreement in the Merger Treatment. 
                                                           
27 Individual firms’ profits under each collusive agreement are described in Appendix 3.B. 
 Hypothesis 5:  Prices will converge to competitive prices in markets where cartel 
members control less than 60% of the production capacity. 
 
For any cartel to face a positive residual demand it is necessary that  𝐾Γ > 𝐾 − 𝑀 =
150. In fact, in our setting, the smallest capacity combination that satisfies this 
condition is 160. Therefore, it is not possible to reach a successful explicit collusive 
agreement if the cartel does not control at least 60% of the market capacity. 
 
 
 
4. Results 
 
Concerning the statistical analysis, we have data from 64 markets: 32 per treatment. 
Due to the structure of the experiment, where re-matching occurs in groups of 12 for 
Baseline and groups of 10 for Merger, groups of 4 markets involve the same subjects 
(two in part 1 and two in part 2) and therefore they are not independent. When doing 
non-parametric tests, we use as a single observation the averaged measure from the 4 
non-independent markets. Therefore we have 8 independent observations per treatment. 
When doing parametric analysis, standard errors are clustered using the non-
independent markets as a single observation. 
Section 4.1 studies the type of cartels that emerged in the lab. Section 4.2 studies 
the effect of the simulated merger, comparing prices between treatments. Section 4.3 
focuses on markets where explicit collusion is feasible, introducing a new variable that 
measures the share of aggregate capacity that joins communication. 
 
 
4.1. Cartel composition: All-inclusive vs. partial cartels 
 
Cartel participation and therefore cartel composition can be determined in two different 
ways from the individual decisions made by subjects during the experiment. As 
generally done by antitrust authorities in real-world markets, cartel participation can be 
determined by firms’ individual communication decisions. A firm belongs to the cartel 
agreement if it decides to communicate. Cartel participation can be also defined by the 
price decisions made by firms. Firms charging a price equal to 10 and facing a positive 
residual demand28 can be considered as cartel members, while the rest of the firms can 
be seen as outsiders. This definition can be justified from the theoretical model without 
communication. When a group of firms charge a price of 10, any deviation from this 
price in a single period affects the profits of the other firms in the cartel, and deviations 
may be punished. On the other hand, firms charging a price lower than 10 do not affect 
other firms’ profits when changing their price decision and therefore just maximize 
their profits in every period. 
The first experimental result states that, independently of the approach used to 
measure cartel participation, all-inclusive cartels are very rarely found. In particular, 
there is no single market where all firms choose a price of 10 for a single period. If 
communication decisions are used as criterion, all firms decide to communicate in only 
11 of the 192 communication decisions (3 communication decisions per market). 
 
Result 1a: No all-inclusive cartels emerged if cartel participation is defined by price 
decisions. 
Result 1b: If cartel participation is defined by communication decisions, all-inclusive 
cartels emerged just in 5,7% of the communication decisions. (3,1% and 8,3% for 
Baseline and Merger respectively) 
 
Therefore, it is evident from this result that in almost all markets, either no cartel or a 
partial cartel emerged in the lab. Graphs representing the evolution of price decisions 
per firm in each of the 64 experimental markets are found in Appendix C. From this 
graphs we can conclude that partial cartels emerged in 32 of the 64 experimental 
markets (cartels consisting of at least two firms charging a price of 10 and facing a 
positive demand while other firm(s) charging a lower price).29 
 
Result 2: Cartel agreements (cartels consisting of at least two firms charging a price of 
10 and facing a positive demand) are found in half of the experimental markets. All 
collusive agreements are partial cartels. 
 
Result 2 confirms the first experimental hypotheses: endogenous partial cartels are 
found in the lab. Figure 1 shows that cartel incidence does not vary across treatments. 
                                                           
28  Sets of firms charging a price of 10 and not facing a positive residual demand are not considered to 
be a cartel. 
29 Price structure for at least one round. The stability and length of the cartels will be studied in the 
next section. 
The next natural question is to uncover the nature and composition of the partial cartels 
formed. Cartel composition is relevant because can play a key role in the stability of 
the cartels formed, as discussed later on. Even though cartel incidence does not vary 
across treatments, cartel composition does. Cartels can be divided into two types 
depending on the size of the firms that belong to the collusive agreement: cartels formed 
only by big firms and cartels formed by both small and big firms.30  Figure 2 shows the 
distribution of cartel types between treatments using price decisions approach to 
classify cartels. The distribution of cartel types is clearly different between treatments 
(Fisher Test p-value=0.029). Cartels that emerged in the Baseline Treatment contain 
mostly only big firms. Most of the cartels that emerged in the Merger Treatment include 
both big and small firms. There are a considerable amount of cartels involving all big 
firms in the Merger Treatment too. This type of cartel, according to theory, is not 
internally stable, what may imply that internal stability is not always relevant 
behaviorally. No cartel agreements with only the two biggest firms are found. This may 
be explained by the fact participants see this agreement unfair. 
These results are confirmed by the communication decisions of big and small 
firms. Figure 3a and Figure 3b show the likelihood of joining communication for each 
firm type.31 In the Baseline Treatment, it is more likely that big firms join the cartel 
agreement than small firms. Firms 1,2 and 3 join communication more often than small 
firms (two-side Wilcoxon tests; p=0.06, p=0.01, and p=0.07 respectively).  Wilcoxon 
tests do not find significant differences when comparing big firms pairwise. On the 
contrary, small firms do not join less often the cartel agreement in the Merger 
Treatment. 
 
Result 3a: Most of the partial cartels formed in the Baseline Treatment only involve 
big firms.  
Result 3b: Most of the partial cartels formed in the Merger Treatment involve both big 
and small firms. We find also a considerable number of non-internally stable partial 
cartels formed only by the three big firms. 
 
Result 3a confirms hypothesis 2. Hypothesis 3 is only partially confirmed by Result 3b.  
                                                           
30 Small firms alone do not reach the minimum capacity necessary for a cartel to face a positive 
residual demand. 
31  Likelihood of firms 4,5,6 and firms IV, V are averaged. 
A considerable amount of not internal partial cartels involving all big firms are also 
found in the Merger Treatment. This suggests that incentive compatibility with a low 
minimum discount factor and a symmetric distribution of profits plays a more important 
role behaviorally than the internal stability refinement. 
 
Figure 1:  Cartel incidence per treatment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Cartel division using firms’ price decisions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* All cartels found here involve all big firms; these cartels are not internally 
stable. 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3a: Likelihood of joining communication per firm type: Baseline Treatment 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3b: Likelihood of joining communication per firm type: Merger Treatment 
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4.2. Coordinated effects caused by the merger. 
 
One of the goals of our analysis is to compare the degree of competitiveness/efficiency 
before and after the merger. As a measure for competitiveness we use the average 
selling price (average price decision weighted by the quantity sold by each of the firms). 
This measure is an exact linear combination of alternative variables to determine market 
competitiveness, like individual/aggregate profits or consumer surplus. The difference 
in prices between treatments measures the coordinated effects of the merger imposed 
in the design. Figure 4 shows average selling price for each of the treatments. Price 
decreases almost by one unit because of the merger, but this difference is not significant 
(two sided Mann-Whitney U test p-value=0.11).  
 
Result 4: The merger has no significant effect on the price. 
 
Why is this difference not as big as second part of hypothesis 4 predicted? Two facts 
can explain why the merger did not have an overall strong effect on market 
competitiveness. First, subjects were not able to reach a collusive agreement in half of 
the groups. An explicit collusive agreement is not easy to reach in our setting (firms 
joining communication need to represent at least 60% of market capacity). As will be 
shown in the next section, prices are not significantly different between treatments in 
markets where no collusive agreement is reached. Only significant price differences are 
found when enough firms join communication. Second, there are a considerable amount 
of non-internally stable cartels involving all big firms in the Merger Treatment, which 
is not predicted by the theoretical model. 
 
Figure 4: Average selling price per treatment 
 
4.3. Cartel size and market prices. 
 
In this section we explore the relation between the share of aggregate capacity joining 
communication and the degree of competition. Markets can be distinguished in terms 
of whether enough capacity joins communication to form an explicit collusive 
agreement. Under the parameters used in the experiment, 60% of aggregate capacity 
should join communication (𝐾Γ ≥ 160).
32 If this threshold is not reached in a certain 
communication decision stage, it is not possible to reach an explicit collusive 
agreement. Using this division, prices are compared between treatments for each of 
both cases. Figure 5 shows the results.  First, average selling prices are clearly higher 
in markets where enough capacity is reached to form a potential cartel (two-sided 
Mann-Whitney U-test p=0.01 for both Baseline and Merger). This is in line with 
hypothesis 5. Second, in markets where an explicit collusive agreement is not possible, 
average selling prices do not significantly differ between treatments (two-sided Mann-
Whitney U-test p=0.65). In other words, the merger does not affect competition in 
markets where no cartels are operating. Finally, if we compare average selling prices in 
markets where enough capacity joins communication, average selling price decreases 
significantly because of the merger (Mann –Whitney U test p=0.025). This result is 
summarized below.  
 
Result 5: Average selling price significantly decreases by 30% due to the merger in 
markets where firms joining the cartel control at least 60% of the production capacity.  
 
Result 5 suggests that the merger makes markets more competitive when a cartel is in 
operation. Studying the stability of the cartels formed in each of the treatments can 
serve as supporting evidence for this claim. Cartel stability is measured by the number 
of rounds that all cartel members decide a price in accordance to the collusive 
agreement (agreement explicitly reached during the chat or implicitly reached from a 
certain round). Figure 6 shows that cartels are more stable in the Baseline Treatment. 
On average, in markets where a cartel emerged, the collusive agreement worked as 
agreed in 8.9 of the 15 rounds in the Baseline Treatment, but only in 4.8 rounds in the 
                                                           
32 Share of aggregate capacity is calculated using the average among the three communication 
decisions in a market. 
Merger Treatment (Mann-Whitney U test p=0.015). This result confirms the first part 
of hypothesis 4. 
 
Result 6:  Cartels are less stable after the merger. 
 
Finally, the relation between capacity joining communication and market prices is 
studied more in deep. Figure 7 shows that there exists a clear positive relation between 
the share of capacity joining communication and average selling price in a certain 
market. This effect may be different between treatments though. Consider the following 
specification: 
 
                  𝐴𝑆𝑃𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖                                      (1) 
 
Where 𝐴𝑆𝑃𝑖 is the average selling price over the 15 rounds in group 𝑖, 𝑇𝑖 is a dummy 
variable that takes value 1 for the Merger Treatment and 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 is the average share 
of market capacity that joins communication in group 𝑖. Specification (1) shows the 
effect of the merger on average selling price controlling for the share of capacity joining 
communication. First column in Table 1 shows the results. Given a certain share of 
capacity joining communication, average selling price decreases by almost one unit due 
to the merger. This is significant at 10% level.33  
This last specification does not allow for different effects of the merger on prices 
for different share of capacities. But in fact, this may be the case. Consider the following 
specification: 
 
         𝐴𝑆𝑃𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 ∗ 𝑇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖                         (3) 
 
This specification is totally flexible in terms of slope and intercept for each of the 
treatments. Specification (3) in Table 1 shows the results.  𝛽1 is not significantly 
different from 0, meaning that the merger does not have any effect on prices when all 
firms decide to not communicate. On the other hand, as capacity controlled by the cartel 
increases, the effect of the merger becomes stronger. The effect of the merger is 
                                                           
33  Similar result is found when controlling for a dummy variable that takes value 1 if enough capacity 
joins communication. See specification (2) in Table 1. 
maximized when the share of capacity controlled by the cartel reaches 1. This is 
represented in Figure 8. 
 
Finally, an alternative specification can be constructed that may better explain how 
market prices depend on the cartel size and on the merger imposed in the design. 
Consider the following specification:  
 
𝑆𝑃𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐾𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 ∗ 𝐾𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑇𝑖 ∗ 𝐾𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖      (4) 
 
where 𝐾𝑖 is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the capacity joining communication 
reaches the minimum necessary to reach an explicit collusive agreement in group 𝑖. 
Specification (4) in Table 1 shows the results. In groups where not enough capacity 
joins communication (𝐾𝑖 = 0), neither the merger nor the capacity controlled by the 
cartel affects prices. In contrast, when the threshold is reached (𝐾𝑖 = 1), price increases 
when more capacity is controlled by the cartel (in both treatments). In addition, the 
merger significantly reduces the price by 2.49 units. This result is graphically 
represented in Figure 9.  𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 and  𝑇𝑖 do not have an effect when the capacity 
controlled by the cartel does not reach the threshold.  On the other hand, when firms 
that form the cartel control enough capacity, the merger has a strong negative effect on 
prices and capacity a positive effect on prices. The last results are summarized below. 
 
Result 7a: The effect of the merger on market prices increases with cartel size: it has 
no effect when no firms join communication, and it is maximized when the cartel 
controls all the capacity. 
Result 7b: The merger and the capacity joining communication do not affect market 
prices when the capacity threshold is not reached. In contrast, the merger decreases 
average selling price when enough firms join communication. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 5: Average selling price by capacity threshold and by treatment. 
 
 
 
Figure 6:  Number of rounds that the cartel works as agreed. 
 
 
 
Figure 7: ASP and average share of capacity joining communication 
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Table 1: Relation between average selling price, cartel size and the merger 
 
 𝐴𝑆𝑃𝑖 (1) 𝐴𝑆𝑃𝑖 (2) 𝐴𝑆𝑃𝑖 (3) 𝐴𝑆𝑃𝑖 (4) 
Intercept 
0.8721 
(0.9307) 
3.8512*** 
(0.9307) 
-0.8227 
(0.9831) 
1.4957 
(1.5684) 
𝑇𝑖 
-0.9721* 
(0.5131) 
-1.1196** 
(0.5206) 
1.6431 
(1.4669) 
-0.1630 
(0.8129) 
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 
7.7453*** 
(1.4787) 
 11.0054*** 
(1.4750) 
5.2526 
(3.9492) 
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖
∗ 𝑇𝑖 
  -4.9569** 
(4.8370) 
 
𝐾𝑖 
 
 
2.5783*** 
(0.6687) 
 -7.0992*** 
(2.2367) 
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖
∗ 𝐾𝑖 
   12.6316*** 
(4.2850) 
𝑇𝑖 ∗ 𝐾𝑖 
 
 
 
 
 -2.3175** 
(0.9010) 
n 64 64 64 64 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
 *p<0.1 ,  **p<0.05 , *** p<0.01 
 
 
Figure 8: Relation between average selling price, cartel size and treatment 
 
 
 
 Figure 9: Relation between average selling price, cartel size and treatment 
 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper contributes to the literature that uses experimental methods for antitrust and 
economic policy making. In particular, this work is the first experimental study 
systematically finding partial cartels in a setting in which the cartel size is endogenous. 
This is policy relevant because the coordinated effects of mergers may depend crucially 
on the kind of cartels that may operate in a market. Assuming that only all-inclusive 
cartels may emerge, like in Compte et al. (2002), may lead to misleading results. In 
contrast, in this work, predictions are derived from a variant of B&H’s model where 
partial cartels may emerge endogenously. Our experimental results support the model 
predictions in many ways. Stable partial cartels involving only the big firms are most 
of the cartels found in the Baseline Treatment. Less stable partial cartels involving big 
and small firms are found in the Merger Treatment. In contrast, some predictions are 
not completely validated. The merger did not have a strong effect on market prices as 
predicted by the model. This was in part due to the fact that a considerable number of 
internally unstable cartels emerged in the Merger Treatment, which may put some doubt 
on the behavioral relevance of the internal stability refinement. The merger did decrease 
prices significantly in markets where the cartel controlled at least 60% of the production 
capacity. 
In conclusion, merger analysis focusing on concentration measures like the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index or on all-inclusive cartels alone (as Compte et al. (2002) 
do for the Nestlé-Perrier case) may overlook important effects of a merger. An 
experimental simulation of a merger case could reveal what theory is the most relevant 
for the particular market in which the merging firms are active, so that the antitrust 
authority could reach a better informed decision regarding the coordinated effects of a 
merger. 
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APPENDIX A: 
 
 
Proof Proposition 1: 
 
Consider the following two cases: 
 
• 𝐾Γ > 𝑀 :  
 
Suppose 𝑃Γ < 𝑣. Firm 𝑖 ∉ Γ will never charge 𝑃𝑖 > 𝑃Γ because 𝐷𝑖(𝑃𝑖 , 𝑃−𝑖) = 0 and 
therefore Π𝑖 = 0. If firm 𝑖 ∉ Γ charges 𝑃Γ will produce under capacity. If it charges 
𝑃𝑖 < 𝑃Γ, it produces at capacity independently of what the prices of the other firms 𝑗 ∉
Γ. This is because cartel Γ needs to satisfy: 𝐾Γ > 𝐾 − 𝑀 ⟶  𝑀 − (𝐾 − 𝐾Γ) > 0 ⟶
𝑀 >  (𝐾 − 𝐾Γ).  The total capacity of the outsiders is smaller than M so they can sell 
all units. Because firm 𝑖 ∉ Γ is producing at capacity ∀ 𝑃𝑖 < 𝑃Γ, for a sufficiently small  
𝜀, the optimal price ∀𝑖 ∉ Γ is 𝑃Γ − 𝜀 .  For 𝑃Γ = 𝑣 same proof without the case 𝑃𝑖 > 𝑃Γ. 
 
• 𝐾Γ < 𝑀 :   
 
Suppose 𝑃Γ < 𝑣 and that outsiders charge a price higher than 𝑃Γ. First, notice that under 
this case, there are at least two outsiders. Suppose there is only one firm 𝑖 ∉ Γ. A3 
implies  ∑ 𝑘𝑗 = 𝐾Γ ≥ 𝑀 𝑗≠𝑖∉Γ that contradicts  𝐾Γ < 𝑀. Therefore, under this situation, 
outsiders compete a la Bertrand for a residual capacity 𝑀 − 𝐾Γ. Suppose all  𝑖 ∉ Γ 
charge 𝑃𝑖 = 𝑣. They produce under capacity because 𝐾Γ + (𝐾 − 𝐾Γ) > 𝑀. This is not 
a Nash Equilibrium for outside firms because each firm 𝑖 ∉ Γ would obtain higher 
profits deviating to price 𝑣 − 𝜀 for a sufficiently small 𝜀. To proof that, we have to 
compare the demand faced by firm   𝑖 ∉ Γ charging 𝑃𝑖 = 𝑣, that is  
𝑀−𝐾Γ
𝐾−𝐾Γ
ki and the 
demand charging   𝑃𝑖 =  𝑣 − 𝜀  that is min (𝑘𝑖 , 𝑀 − 𝐾Γ).  
𝑀−𝐾Γ
𝐾−𝐾Γ
< 1  because K>M.  
Therefore 
𝑀−𝐾Γ
𝐾−𝐾Γ
ki < 𝑘𝑖. In addition,   
𝑘𝑖
𝐾−𝐾Γ
< 1 because 𝐾 − 𝐾Γ < 𝑘𝑖 when  there are 
two or more outsiders. Therefore  
𝑀−𝐾Γ
𝐾−𝐾Γ
ki <  𝑀 − 𝐾Γ. So we can conclude that 
𝑀−𝐾Γ
𝐾−𝐾Γ
ki < min (𝑘𝑖 , 𝑀 − 𝐾Γ).   With the same reasoning, firms continue undercutting 
prices until they reach 𝑃𝑖 = 𝑃Γ + 𝜀. Again, this is not a Nash Equilibrium for 
sufficiently small 𝜀 because firm 𝑖 ∉ Γ can charge 𝑃Γ − 2𝜀 and face demand 𝑘𝑖  
(because 𝐾Γ > 𝐾 − 𝑀) compared to the demand faced when charging 𝑃𝑖 = 𝑃Γ + 𝜀, that 
is  
𝑀−𝐾Γ
𝐾−𝐾Γ
ki . A3 implies K>M and therefore 𝑘𝑖  >
𝑀−𝐾Γ
𝐾−𝐾Γ
𝑘𝑖 .  Therefore firms never find 
optimal to charge 𝑃𝑖 > 𝑃Γ. Finally, we have to prove that 𝑃𝑖 = 𝑃Γ for 𝑖 ∉ Γ is not a Nash 
Equilibrium for any other price combinations of the other outsiders.  Because firms 
never charge 𝑃𝑖 > 𝑃Γ and K>M, charging 𝑃𝑖 = 𝑃Γ implies to produce under capacity.  
In contrast, charging 𝑃𝑖 < 𝑃Γ implies to produce at capacity. Therefore it is optimal for 
every 𝑖 ∉ Γ to charge 𝑃𝑖 = 𝑃Γ − 𝜀.  They all produce at capacity because so no further 
undercutting is necessary. For 𝑃Γ = 𝑣 same proof without the case 𝑃𝑖 > 𝑃Γ.    ∎ 
 
Notice: Profits of outsiders given cartel Γ is: Π𝑗(Γ) = (𝑃Γ − 𝜀 − 𝑐)𝑘𝑗 , ∀ 𝑗 ∉  Γ 
 
Proof Proposition 2: 
 
The problem of the cartel is to find the price 𝑃Γ that maximizes the infinite stream of 
joint profits satisfying the ICC: 
𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑉(𝑝, Γ) ≡ (
1
1 − 𝛿
) (𝑃Γ − 𝑐)((𝑀 − (𝐾 − 𝐾Γ)) 
𝑠. 𝑡. 
𝑉𝑖(𝑝, Γ)  ≥ π𝑖,𝐶
∗ +
𝛿
1−𝛿
𝜀
𝑀𝑘𝑖
𝐾
 , ∀𝑖 ∈ Γ       (ICC) 
 
where  𝑉𝑖(𝑝, Γ) ≡  (
1
1−𝛿
) (𝑃Γ − 𝑐)((𝑀 − (𝐾 − 𝐾Γ)) (
𝑘𝑖
𝐾Γ
)  and 
 
π𝑖,𝐶
∗
= {
   (𝑃Γ − 𝜀 − 𝑐)𝑘𝑖                                                                               𝑖𝑓     𝐾 − 𝐾Γ + 𝑘𝑖 ≤ 𝑀
   𝑀𝑎𝑥 { (𝑃Γ − 𝜀 − 𝑐)
𝑀𝑘𝑖
𝐾 − 𝐾Γ + 𝑘𝑖
, (𝑃Γ − 2𝜀 − 𝑐)𝑘𝑖  }             𝑖𝑓     𝐾 − 𝐾Γ + 𝑘𝑖 > 𝑀
 
 
If  𝐾 − 𝐾Γ + 𝑘𝑖 ≤ 𝑀 , the ICC becomes: 
 
  (
1
1 − 𝛿
) (𝑃Γ − 𝑐)((𝑀 − (𝐾 − 𝐾Γ)) (
𝑘𝑖
𝐾Γ
)  ≥ (𝑃Γ − 𝜀 − 𝑐)𝑘𝑖  +
𝛿
1 − 𝛿
𝜀
𝑀𝑘𝑖
𝐾
⟺ 
(𝑃Γ − 𝑐)((𝑀 − (𝐾 − 𝐾Γ)) (
𝑘𝑖
𝐾Γ
)  ≥ (1 − 𝛿)(𝑃Γ − 𝜀 − 𝑐)𝑘𝑖  + 𝛿𝜀
𝑀𝑘𝑖
𝐾
 
When  𝜀 ⟶ 0 the ICC becomes: 
 
(𝑃Γ − 𝑐)((𝑀 − (𝐾 − 𝐾Γ)) (
𝑘𝑖
𝐾Γ
)  ≥ (1 − 𝛿)(𝑃Γ − 𝑐)𝑘𝑖  ⟺ 
((𝑀 − (𝐾 − 𝐾Γ)) (
1
𝐾Γ
)  ≥ (1 − 𝛿) 
 
𝛿 ≥
𝐾 − 𝑀
𝐾Γ
 
 
This last expression does not depend on 𝑃Γ. 
 
If  𝐾 − 𝐾Γ + 𝑘𝑖 > 𝑀 and for sufficiently small 𝜀  , π𝑖,𝐶
∗ = (𝑃Γ − 2𝜀 − 𝑐)𝑘𝑖 . Hence, ICC 
becomes: 
 
  (
1
1 − 𝛿
) (𝑃Γ − 𝑐)((𝑀 − (𝐾 − 𝐾Γ)) (
𝑘𝑖
𝐾Γ
)  ≥ (𝑃Γ − 2𝜀 − 𝑐)𝑘𝑖  +
𝛿
1 − 𝛿
𝜀
𝑀𝑘𝑖
𝐾
 
(𝑃Γ − 𝑐)((𝑀 − (𝐾 − 𝐾Γ)) (
𝑘𝑖
𝐾Γ
)  ≥ (1 − 𝛿)(𝑃Γ − 2𝜀 − 𝑐)𝑘𝑖  + 𝛿𝜀
𝑀𝑘𝑖
𝐾
 
 
When  𝜀 ⟶ 0 the ICC becomes: 
 
(𝑃Γ − 𝑐)((𝑀 − (𝐾 − 𝐾Γ)) (
𝑘𝑖
𝐾Γ
)  ≥ (1 − 𝛿)(𝑃Γ − 𝑐)𝑘𝑖  ⟺ 
((𝑀 − (𝐾 − 𝐾Γ)) (
1
𝐾Γ
)  ≥ (1 − 𝛿) 
𝛿 ≥
𝐾 − 𝑀
𝐾Γ
 
 
This last expression does not depend on 𝑃Γ. 
 
Therefore for a sufficiently small  𝜀 the problem of the cartel becomes: 
𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑉(𝑝, Γ) ≡ (
1
1 − 𝛿
) (𝑃Γ − 𝑐)((𝑀 − (𝐾 − 𝐾Γ)) 
𝑠. 𝑡. 
𝛿 ≥
𝐾 − 𝑀
𝐾Γ
 , ∀𝑖 ∈ Γ 
 
Cartel stability does not depend on 𝑃Γ and therefore cartel profits are maximized when 
𝑃Γ = 𝑣 ∎ 
 
 
 
Proof Proposition 3: 
 
To proof proposition 3, we have to consider 3 cases: 
 
1) If  𝐾 − 𝐾Γ + 𝑘𝑖 ≤ 𝑀 , the ICC becomes: 
 
(
1
1 − 𝛿
) (𝑃Γ − 𝑐)((𝑀 − (𝐾 − 𝐾Γ)) (
𝑘𝑖
𝐾Γ
)  ≥ (𝑃Γ − 𝜀 − 𝑐)𝑘𝑖  +
𝛿
1 − 𝛿
𝜀
𝑀𝑘𝑖
𝐾
⟺ 
𝛿𝜀
𝑀𝑘𝑖
𝐾
+ (1 − 𝛿)(𝑃Γ − 𝜀 − 𝑐)𝑘𝑖 − (𝑃Γ − 𝑐)((𝑀 − (𝐾 − 𝐾Γ)) (
𝑘𝑖
𝐾Γ
)  ≤  0 ⟺ 
𝛿𝑚𝑖𝑛𝜀
𝑀
𝐾
+ (1 − 𝛿𝑚𝑖𝑛)(𝑃Γ − 𝜀 − 𝑐) − (𝑃Γ − 𝑐)((𝑀 − (𝐾 − 𝐾Γ)) (
1
𝐾Γ
) =  0 
 
Solving for 𝛿𝑚𝑖𝑛 we get:      𝛿𝑚𝑖𝑛 =
𝐾
𝐾Γ
(𝑃Γ−𝑐)(𝐾−𝑀)−𝜖𝐾Γ
(𝑃Γ−𝑐)𝐾−𝜖(𝐾+𝑀)
 
When 𝜖 ⟶ 0, 𝛿𝑚𝑖𝑛  we already proved that : 𝛿𝑚𝑖𝑛 ⟶
𝐾−𝑀
𝐾Γ
 
 
0 <
𝐾−𝑀
𝐾Γ
< 1 because A3 implies 𝐾 − 𝑀 > 0  and  𝐾 − 𝑀 < 𝐾Γ .  Therefore we 
already proved that when 𝜖 ⟶ 0, there exists a 𝛿𝑚𝑖𝑛 between 0 and 1. As 𝜀 becomes 
bigger, 𝛿𝑚𝑖𝑛 decreases: 
𝜕𝛿𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝜕𝜀
=
𝐾(𝑃Γ − 𝑐)(𝐾
2 − 𝑀2 − 𝐾Γ
2)
𝐾Γ(𝑐𝐾 + 𝐾(𝜀 − 𝑃Γ) + 𝑀𝜀)2
< 0 
To proof that this expression is negative we only have to prove that  𝐾Γ
2 >  𝐾2 − 𝑀2. 
𝐾 − 𝐾Γ < 𝑀 ⟺ 𝐾Γ > 𝐾 − 𝑀 ⟺  𝐾Γ
2 > (𝐾 − 𝑀)2 
In addition: 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐾 − 𝑀 > 0 , (𝐾 − 𝑀)2 < 𝐾2 − 𝑀2 
Hence:(𝐾 − 𝑀)2 < 𝐾2 − 𝑀2 < 𝐾Γ
2 
 
Therefore,  𝛿𝑚𝑖𝑛 decreases for bigger 𝜖 .  It would become 0 when  𝜀 =
𝐾(𝑃Γ−𝑐)(𝐾−𝑀)
𝐾Γ
 . 
But this 𝜀 is not possible because < 𝑃Γ − 𝑐 . This is in contradiction with the fact that 
𝐾(𝐾−𝑀)
𝐾Γ
> 1 
 
 
2) 𝐾 − 𝐾Γ + 𝑘𝑖 > 𝑀 and π𝑖,𝐶
∗ (𝑃Γ − 𝜀) <  π𝑖,𝐶
∗ (𝑃Γ − 2𝜀) . Under this scenario, the ICC 
becomes: 
 
 
  (
1
1 − 𝛿
) (𝑃Γ − 𝑐)((𝑀 − (𝐾 − 𝐾Γ)) (
𝑘𝑖
𝐾Γ
)  ≥ (𝑃Γ − 2𝜀 − 𝑐)𝑘𝑖  +
𝛿
1 − 𝛿
𝜀
𝑀𝑘𝑖
𝐾
⟺ 
𝛿𝜀
𝑀𝑘𝑖
𝐾
+ (1 − 𝛿)(𝑃Γ − 2𝜀 − 𝑐)𝑘𝑖 − (𝑃Γ − 𝑐)((𝑀 − (𝐾 − 𝐾Γ)) (
𝑘𝑖
𝐾Γ
)  ≤  0 ⟺ 
𝛿𝑚𝑖𝑛𝜀
𝑀
𝐾
+ (1 − 𝛿𝑚𝑖𝑛)(𝑃Γ − 2𝜀 − 𝑐) − (𝑃Γ − 𝑐)((𝑀 − (𝐾 − 𝐾Γ)) (
1
𝐾Γ
) =  0 
 
Solving for 𝛿𝑚𝑖𝑛 we get: 𝛿𝑚𝑖𝑛 =
𝐾
𝐾Γ
(𝑃Γ−𝑐)(𝐾−𝑀)−2𝜖𝐾Γ
(𝑃Γ−𝑐)𝐾−𝜖(2𝐾+𝑀)
 
 
When 𝜖 ⟶ 0  we already showed that 𝛿𝑚𝑖𝑛 ⟶
𝐾−𝑀
𝐾Γ
, again between 0 and 1.  
 
As 𝜀 becomes bigger, 𝛿𝑚𝑖𝑛 decreases:  
𝜕𝛿𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝜕𝜀
=
𝐾(𝑃−𝑐)[2(𝐾2−𝐾Γ
2)−𝑀(𝑀+𝐾)]
(𝐾𝐾Γ(𝑃−𝑐)−𝜀(2𝐾+𝑀))2
< 0 
We already showed that 2𝐾2 − 2𝑀2 − 2𝐾Γ
2 < 0 ⟹ 2𝐾2 − 2𝐾Γ
2 − 𝑀2 − 𝑀𝐾 < 0, 
because 𝐾 > 𝑀. It would become 0 when =
𝐾(𝑃Γ−𝑐)(𝐾−𝑀)
2𝐾Γ
 . But this 𝜀 is not possible 
because (𝜀 < 𝑃Γ − 𝑐 . This is in contradiction with the fact that 
𝐾(𝐾−𝑀)
2𝐾Γ
> 1 
 
3) Finally, last case is when 𝐾 − 𝐾Γ + 𝑘𝑖 > 𝑀 and π𝑖,𝐶
∗ (𝑃Γ − 𝜀) ≥  π𝑖,𝐶
∗ (𝑃Γ − 2𝜀) . 
Under this scenario, the ICC becomes: 
 
  (
1
1 − 𝛿
) (𝑃Γ − 𝑐)((𝑀 − (𝐾 − 𝐾Γ)) (
𝑘𝑖
𝐾Γ
)  
≥ (𝑃Γ − 𝜀 − 𝑐)
𝑀𝑘𝑖
𝐾 − 𝐾Γ + 𝑘𝑖
 +
𝛿
1 − 𝛿
𝜀
𝑀𝑘𝑖
𝐾
 
 
(𝑃Γ − 𝑐)((𝑀 − (𝐾 − 𝐾Γ)) (
1
𝐾Γ
)  ≥ (1 − 𝛿)(𝑃Γ − 𝜀 − 𝑐)
𝑀
𝐾 − 𝐾Γ + 𝑘𝑖
 + 𝛿𝜀
𝑀
𝐾
⟺ 
𝛿𝜀
𝑀
𝐾
+ (1 − 𝛿)(𝑃Γ − 𝜀 − 𝑐)
𝑀
𝐾 − 𝐾Γ + 𝑘𝑖
−
(𝑃Γ − 𝑐)(𝑀 − 𝐾 + 𝐾Γ)
𝐾Γ
≤ 0 ⟺ 
𝛿𝑚𝑖𝑛𝜀
𝑀
𝐾
+ (1 − 𝛿𝑚𝑖𝑛)(𝑃Γ − 𝜀 − 𝑐)
𝑀
𝐾 − 𝐾Γ + 𝑘𝑖
−
(𝑃Γ − 𝑐)(𝑀 − 𝐾 + 𝐾Γ)
𝐾Γ
= 0 ⟺ 
 
When 𝜖 ⟶ 0: 𝛿𝑚𝑖𝑛 ⟶ 1 −
(𝑀−𝐾+𝐾Γ)(𝐾−𝐾Γ+𝑘𝑖)
𝐾Γ𝑀 
, that is between 0 and 1 because  
0 <
(𝑀−𝐾+𝐾Γ)
𝑀 
< 1.  
It is not easy to solve analytically for 𝛿𝑚𝑖𝑛 under this case. But we can apply the implicit 
function theorem to find the sign of 
𝜕𝛿𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝜕𝜀
. We get: 
 
𝑀
𝐾
(
𝜕𝛿𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝜕𝜀
𝜀 + 𝛿𝑚𝑖𝑛) +
𝑀
𝐾 − 𝐾Γ + 𝑘𝑖
(1 +
𝜕𝛿𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝜕𝜀
(𝑃Γ − 𝜀 − 𝑐) − 𝛿𝑚𝑖𝑛) = 0 ⟺ 
 
𝜕𝛿𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝜕𝜀
(
𝑀
𝐾
𝜀 +
𝑀
𝐾 − 𝐾Γ + 𝑘𝑖
(𝑃Γ − 𝜀 − 𝑐)) = −
𝑀
𝐾
−
𝑀
𝐾 − 𝐾Γ + 𝑘𝑖
(1 − 𝛿𝑚𝑖𝑛) 
 
The LHS is positive while the RHS negative, so it is clear that 
𝜕𝛿𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝜕𝜀
< 0. ∎ 
 
 
Proof Proposition 4a: 
 
Π𝑗(Γ) ≥ (1 − 𝛿)𝑉𝑗(𝑃Γ, Γ + {j})   ∀ 𝑗 ∉ Γ can be written as : 
(𝑣 − 𝑐 − 𝜀)𝑘𝑗 ≥ (𝑣 − 𝑐)(𝑀 − 𝐾 + 𝐾Γ + 𝑘𝑗)
𝑘𝑗
𝐾Γ + 𝑘𝑗
  ∀ 𝑗 ∉ Γ ⟺ 
(𝑣 − 𝑐) (1 −
𝑀−𝐾+𝐾Γ+𝑘𝑗
𝐾Γ+𝑘𝑗
) ≥ 𝜀   ∀ 𝑗 ∉ Γ ⟺  𝜀 ≤ (𝑣 − 𝑐) (
𝐾−𝑀
𝐾Γ+𝑘𝑗
) = 𝜀1   ∀ 𝑗 ∉ Γ ∎ 
 
Proof Proposition 4b: 
 
First, we prove that: 
 
 If 𝐾 − 𝐾Γ + 𝑘𝑖 ≥ 𝑀    ∀ 𝑖 ∈ Γ  ⟹ (1 − 𝛿)𝑉𝑖(𝑃Γ, Γ) > Π𝑖(Γ − {𝑖})  ∀ 𝑖 ∈ Γ 
 
The second part of the implication can be written as: 
 
(𝑣 − 𝑐)(𝑀 − 𝐾 + 𝐾Γ)
𝑘𝑖
𝐾Γ
> Π𝑖(Γ − {𝑖}) 
 
If  𝐾 − 𝐾Γ + 𝑘𝑖 ≥ 𝑀 there is no residual demand for the cartel Γ − {𝑖} , so the  cartel 
breaks down and therefore the price go to the one-shot Nash equilibrium prediction. 
Therefore the second part of the implication becomes: 
 
(𝑣 − 𝑐)(𝑀 − 𝐾 + 𝐾Γ)
𝑘𝑖
𝐾Γ
> 𝜀
𝑀𝑘𝑖
𝐾
 ⟺ 𝜀 < (𝑣 − 𝑐)(𝑀 − 𝐾 + 𝐾Γ)
𝐾
𝐾Γ𝑀
= 𝜀2 
Therefore this is true for  𝜀 < 𝜀2 . 
 
Now we prove by contradiction that: 
If (1 − 𝛿)𝑉𝑖(𝑃Γ, Γ) > Π𝑖(Γ − {𝑖})  ∀ 𝑖 ∈ Γ ⟹  𝐾 − 𝐾Γ + 𝑘𝑖 ≥ 𝑀    ∀ 𝑖 ∈ Γ 
 
Suppose 𝐾 − 𝐾Γ + 𝑘𝑖 < 𝑀. The first part of the implication becomes 
 
(𝑣 − 𝑐)(𝑀 − 𝐾 + 𝐾Γ)
𝑘𝑖
𝐾Γ
> (𝑣 − 𝑐 − 𝜀)𝑘𝑖  ⟺ 
 
(𝑣 − 𝑐) (
(𝑀 − 𝐾 + 𝐾Γ)
𝐾Γ
− 1) > −𝜀 ⟺ 
 
𝜀 > (𝑣 − 𝑐)
𝐾 − 𝑀
𝐾Γ
 
 
and this is not possible because  
𝐾−𝑀
𝐾Γ
> 1.  So 𝐾 − 𝐾Γ + 𝑘𝑖 ≥ 𝑀 ∎ 
APPENDIX B: 
Table B1: Parameters used in the Baseline Treatment. 
 
𝑀 = 120 𝑘1 = 80 
𝑣 = 10 𝑘2 = 70 
𝜀 = 1 𝑘3 = 60 
𝑛 = 6 𝑘4 = 𝑘5 = 𝑘6 = 20 
𝑐 = 0 𝐾 = 270 
 
Table B2: Parameters used in the Merger Treatment: 
 
𝑀 = 120 𝑘𝐼 = 90 
𝑣 = 10 𝑘𝐼𝐼 = 80 
𝜀 = 1 𝑘𝐼𝐼𝐼 = 60 
𝑛 = 5 𝑘𝐼𝑉 = 𝑘𝑉 = 20 
𝑐 = 0 𝐾 = 270 
 
 
PROFIT DISTRIBUTION 
 
 
1) Stage Nash Equilibrium 
 
- Baseline Treatment 
Π1 = 35.56 Π2 = 31.11 Π3 = 26.67 
Π4 = 8.89 Π5 = 8.89 Π6 = 8.89 
 
- Merger Treatment: 
ΠI = 40 ΠII = 35.56 ΠIII = 26.67 
ΠIV = 8.89 ΠV = 8.89  
 
  
 
2) All-inclusive cartel: 
 
- Baseline Treatment 
Π1 = 355.56 
 
Π2 = 311.11 
 
 
Π3 = 266.67 
 
 
Π4 = 88.89 
 
Π5 = 88.89 
 
Π6 = 88.89 
 
 
 - Merger Treatment: 
ΠI = 400 
 
ΠII = 355.6 
 
 
ΠIII = 266.7 
 
 
 
ΠIV = 88.89 
 
ΠV = 88.89 
 
 
 
 
  
 
3) Incentive compatible, internally and externally stable partial cartels:  
 
- Baseline Treatment:  
 
i)  𝚪{𝟏,𝟐,𝟑}: 
 
ΠΓ,1 = 228.57 ΠΓ,2 = 200 
 
ΠΓ,3 = 171.43 
 
 
 
Π4 = 180 
 
Π5 = 180 
 
Π6 = 180 
 
   
 
 
 
 
  
   ii)  Γ{1,2,𝑘} ,  Γ{1,3,𝑘} , Γ{2,3,𝑘,𝑙}  𝑘, 𝑙 𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠 
 
ΠΓ,1 = 94.12 ΠΓ,2 = 82.36 
 
ΠΓ,k = 23.53 
 
 
 
Π3 = 540 
 
Πi = 180 
 
Πj = 180 
 
 
 
  
ΠΓ,1 = 50 ΠΓ,3 = 37.5 
 
ΠΓ,k = 12.5 
 
 
 
Π2 = 630 
 
Πi = 180 
 
Πj = 180 
 
 
ΠΓ,2 = 82.36 ΠΓ,3 = 70.59 
 
ΠΓ,k,l = 23.53 
 
 
 
Π1 = 720 
 
Πi = 180 
 
 
 
- Merger Treatment:  
 
i)  𝚪{𝑰,𝑰𝑰 }: 
 
ΠΓ,I = 105.88 ΠΓ,II = 94.11 
 
 
 
 
ΠIII = 540 
 
ΠIV = 180 
 
ΠV = 180 
 
 
     
  ii)  Γ{𝐼,𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝑘} ,  Γ{𝐼𝐼,𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝑘}  𝑘 𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 
 
ΠΓ,I = 50 ΠΓ,III = 37.5 ΠΓ,k = 12.5 
  
 
 
ΠII = 630 
 
Πi = 180 
 
 
 
 
ΠΓ,II = 50 ΠΓ,III = 37.5 
 
ΠΓ,k = 12.5 
 
 
 
ΠI = 630 
 
Πi = 180 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 3.C: 
Evolution Price decisions Part 1 Baseline Treatment 
Groups where partial cartels emerged: 2,3,7,11,13,15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evolution Price decisions Part 2 Baseline Treatment 
 
Groups where partial cartels emerged: 1,2,3,4,8,9,10,11,12,15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evolution Price decisions Part 1 Merger Treatment 
 
Groups where partial cartels emerged: 6,7,12,13,15,16 
 
 
 
 
Evolution Price decisions Part 2 Merger Treatment 
Groups where partial cartels emerged:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Evolution Price decisions Part 2 Merger Treatment 
Groups where partial cartels emerged: 4,5,7,8,9,10,11,13,15,16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX D: 
 
B1. Screenshot: How cartel decision is introduced to subjects. 
 
B2. Screenshot: Chat window. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
B3. Screen shot: How past information is introduced to the subjects. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Appendix E: Instructions for Baseline Treatment 
 
Welcome to the experiment! 
 
Introduction: 
A summary of these instructions on paper will be handed out for use during the experiment. 
The experiment consists of 2 parts where you represent a firm in a market. Each part has 15 
rounds. 
At the beginning of each part, you have to decide if you want to join a cartel. If you decide 
to join, you will be able to talk to the other cartel members in your market. You can 
reconsider your decision of joining or not the cartel every 5 rounds. Each time you join the 
cartel has a cost of 20 points. 
After that, you have to decide the price of your good every round. 
The instructions are simple, and if you follow them carefully, you might earn a considerable 
amount of money. What you earn depends on the decisions you make and on the 
decisions of the others. In particular, each 250 points that your 2 firms earn will correspond 
to 1 euro for your pocket. In addition, you will receive a show-up fee of 7 euros, independent 
of your performance in the experiment. You will be privately paid at the end of the 
experiment. 
We ask that you do not communicate with other people during the experiment. Please refrain 
from verbally reacting to events that occur during the experiment. This is very important.  
Raise your hand when you have a question and one of the experimenters will come to your 
table. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Different types of firms: 
The experiment consists of 2 parts where you represent a firm in a market. Each part has 15 
rounds.  
There are always 6 firms in the same market, with the codes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6. These numbers 
have a meaning: they refer to the sizes of the firms. Firms 1, 2 and 3 are LARGE FIRMS. 
Firms 4, 5 and 6 are SMALL FIRMS. The size of a firm is given by the maximum number 
of units of the product that the firm can produce in one round of the game. In other words, 
the size of the firm represents its production capacity. The capacities of each of the firms 
are: 
Capacity firm 1:      80  
Capacity firm 2:     70  
Capacity firm 3:     60 
TOTAL capacity:  270 
Capacity firm 4:    20  
Capacity firm 5:    20  
Capacity firm 6:    20  
 
 
There are 3 large firms and 3 small firms. You will be randomly assigned to one of these 
firms at the beginning of each of the 2 parts of the experiment</b>. Because the selection 
is random, you may represent the same or a different firm in the two parts. 
Within the 15 rounds of the first part of the experiment, you will interact with the same 
5 other participants. When the first part ends, you will randomly be rematched with 
new participants for the 15 rounds of part 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Decisions: 
You have to take 2 decisions: 
1) Decide whether to join a cartel with some of the other firms in your market. This 
decision is made at the beginning of each part, but you can reconsider your decision 
every 5 rounds. At the same time as you, all firms in your market decide individually 
whether to join the cartel or not. The ones who decide to join the cartel will have access to 
a chat window where they will be able to communicate with the other cartel members. 
Communication therefore is possible every 5 rounds (rounds 1, 6 and 11). Each time 
you communicate has a cost of 20 points. There is time limit: cartel members can talk a 
maximum of 5 minutes per time. There are 2 content restrictions: you are not allowed to use 
offensive language and you are not allowed to reveal your identity or your location in the 
room. 
2) Decide on the PRICE at which you offer the product of your firm. You make this 
decision in every round. You can only choose numbers from 0 to 10, not decimals. A profit 
calculator will help you to make this decision. The demand that firms face and the use of the 
profit calculator are explained later in the instructions. 
Information about the outcomes: 
After each round, you will obtain information about the other firms in your market. In 
particular, you will be informed about: 
- Which firms decided to join the cartel and which firms decided not to join 
-  The prices decided by each firm in your market in the previous round 
-  The profits obtained by each firm in your market in the previous round.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Payoffs: 
The 6 firms in the market sell exactly the same good. Moreover, they have  zero production 
costs. Therefore, the profits of your firm are simply equal to  the number of products 
that you sell times the price you charge. Remember that firms have a capacity constraint: 
large firms (1,2 and 3) cannot sell no more than 80, 70 or 60 units and small firms no more 
than 20 
There are 120 consumers willing to buy the good.  They are willing to pay at most 10 
for the good. Each consumer only wants to buy at most one unit, no more. Remember that 
total capacity in the market is 270. This is higher that the number of consumers. Hence, not 
all firms can sell at their maximum capacity. 
 
Consumers want to pay as little as possible for the good. Therefore, they will start buying 
the products of the firm or firms that charge the lowest price. When the capacity of this firm 
or these firms runs out, they will start buying the product from the firm with the next smaller 
price, and so on, until the 120 consumers have bought the product. The firms that are not able 
to sell any product would obtain a profit equal to zero in that round. 
 If many firms (or all firms) decide to charge the same price, it may happen that the total 
capacity of these firms is higher than the number of consumers. Therefore not all the products 
at the same price can be sold. In that case, a proportional rule related to the size of the firms 
is applied. If there are large and small firms charging the same price, large firms would sell 
more goods than small firms. (See examples below)  
To calculate your profits is not easy. That is why a profit calculator will be available at all 
times during the experiment. The following examples can be also helpful to understand how 
your profits will be calculated: 
Example 1: Firms 1, 2 and 3 choose a price of 9. Firms 4, 5 and 6 pick a price of 7. Small 
firms would produce at their maximum capacity, having each a profit of 7 * 20 = 140. Still 
60 consumers want to buy the product. The sum of the capacities of the big firms is 210, so 
they will sell under capacity. Firm 1 will sell ( 80 / 210 ) * 60 = 22,86 units and will obtain 
profits equal to 22,86 * 9 = 205,71. Firm 2 will sell ( 70 / 210 ) * 60 = 20 units with profits 
equal to 20 * 9 = 180. Firm 3 will sell ( 60 / 210 ) * 60 = 17,14 units with profits equal to 
17,14 * 9 = 154,28. Profits of big firms are higher than profits of small firms even when 
selling under capacity but at higher price. 
 
Example 2: Firms 1 and 3 decide to charge a price of 10. Firms 2, 4, 5 and 6 decide to charge 
a price of 9. Because the total capacity of the latter firms is 130 (70 + 20 + 20 + 20), no 
consumers will want to buy the products of Firm 1 and 3. Therefore their profits would be 0. 
The rest of the firms would have positive profits.  Because Firm 2 is a large firm, it would 
sell more products than Firms 4, 5 and 6 allowing it to have higher profits. In particular, Firm 
2 sells ( 70 / 130 ) * 120 = 64.62 units and obtain profits equal to 64.62 * 9 = 581.54. Small 
firms sell ( 20 / 130 ) * 120 = 18.46 units each with profits equal to 18.46 * 9 = 166.15. 
 
During the experiment you will not need to make calculations by hand. In order to make your 
decisions easier, we will provide you with an on-screen profit calculator that will help you to 
choose the price of your product every period 
You will have the opportunity to try the profit calculator now, before the experiment starts. 
 
 
